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manifestations of the making of law of ‘climate justice’ 
Abstract 
This essay discusses the meaning of 'climate justice' and the ways in which it is or is not materialised 
currently in climate change litigation. First I present the immateriality of the abstract concepts that make 
up this composite term: 'climate' and 'justice'. Yet the placing the words adjacent to one another seems to 
mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal action. I trace how the idea of 'climate justice' 
hovers as an elusive idea around the concrete particularities of what can be known about 'climate' 
specifically in relation to 'justice'. These questions are probed in the setting and context of the Philippine 
Human Rights Commission's 2018 Inquiry into the Carbon Majors' (Chevron, Exxon, Shell, BP etc.) 
violation of human rights. 
The aim here is mainly diagnostic: rather than taking legal doctrines of environmental or international 
human rights law as analytical materials, I use a legal materialist approach in order to try to make sense 
of what is concretely happening when an issue of a planetary scale of complexity is addressed and 
represented in a medium-sized moot court room. It helps to bring into vision the specific modes by which 
formats, places and media are enlisted as constitutive elements in the becoming and stabilisation of the 
emerging legal matter of climate justice. My analysis depicts law acting as the medium for upscaling (an 
idea of human justice) and downscaling (of climate science) different knowledges into other frameworks 
of reality than their original ones: to that of the human narrative scale. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol23/iss1/10 
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That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds 
the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying 
out of juridico-political battles... Left to itself, the incalculable and 
giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even 
to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse 
calculation... And so incalculable justice requires us to calculate. 
Derrida (1990: 971)
My matter of concern is ‘climate justice’. 
On 6 and 7 November 2018 I attended the London segment of 
a series of landmark ‘climate justice’ hearings that took place in the 
Moot Court Room of the London School of Economics (LSE). It was 
part of the Philippine Human Rights Commission’s Inquiry (“Carbon 
Major Inquiry”) into claims of human rights violations attributed 
to - or caused by - so-called Carbon Major companies (Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, BP, Shell and others). The Inquiry was initiated in 2015 
by individual Philippine citizens and civil rights organisations with 
the help of Greenpeace. The hearings took place in Manila, at the 
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Columbia University in New York and at the LSE between March 
and December 2018. They were livestreamed, video-recorded and 
transcribed. These media are freely available on the Human Rights 
Commission’s website (https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/). 
The Inquiry resembled a tribunal in its format than an adjudication 
or litigation. Legally speaking, there was no dispute between parties, 
but a petition was taken up. The Inquiry was also unusual in the sense 
that the Commission has no jurisdiction in the countries where the 
Carbon Majors are incorporated, and this might have been reflected in 
the particular way it was conducted. The findings of the Inquiry are not 
legally binding, but the Commission hopes that they will contribute to 
the building of an emerging domestic and international jurisprudence 
of ‘climate justice’. 
This essay is an attempt to understand how a complex matter of a 
planetary scale would be materialised into a ‘legal’ matter in a hearing 
in a moot court room (is it ‘moot’? is it ‘law’?) in central London: how do 
you put and relate a planet, wind and precipitation of “super-typhoons” 
in the Philippines, rain-drenched shivering children, floating corpses, 
mud, hunger, thirst, lack of sanitation, computer datasets, digital 
algorithms, scientists, ethicists, pension actuaries, lawyers, youtube 
livestream, court file numbers, in a medium-sized room over a period 
of two days? Initial conjectures to this question might be: ‘language’ 
or ‘discourse’ employed in ‘legal fiction’, or ways of representing the 
‘world’ within the legal language and performance of human rights. 
In Latourian terms, we could say that these disparate elements were 
associated into a chain of reference so to relate to one another (Latour 
1984). Yet, at the moment, there seems to be more unstable relations 
and materials at play than a human-linguistic, metaphorical or actor-
network post-facto analysis could intimate. This is because justice and 
climate are both abstract concepts. The meaning of their composite, 
‘climate justice’, is not clear. If the ‘parts’ (justice, climate) are moving 
and unstable concepts, how does law figure them ‘whole’ (climate 
justice)? Identifying the constitutive elements of an emerging legal 
matter is one issue, but the more difficult task is to diagnose the nature 
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or dynamics of relations between the elements themselves. This entails 
delineating relations between three issues, which involve questions of 
scale, perspective and knowledge: 
First, if the court room and us are part of the planet, how exactly 
does the legal performance bring the ‘whole’ of which we are also 
part into our partial reality?1 This is a question about my point of 
observation amidst different scales and about the ways in which I 
collate and assemble different parts despite a missing overall whole 
picture. The same question also applies to the Philippine Human Rights 
Commission: is it aware of its relative position within the planetary 
scale, both physically and in terms of its legal power? I show that the 
Commission sought to reflect as messily as possible the multiple and 
fractured realities and its own relations and situatedness within the 
legal and planetary spaces by carefully choosing certain places, media 
and format for the hearings. It did not posit an overarching perspective 
(for example, a trans-generational or trans-species justice or ideas of 
responsibility (Shue 2018)) or causal equivalence between different 
kinds of worlds: human experiential, legal and scientific.
Second, ‘climate justice’ is an emerging legal principle and concern, 
which is increasingly associated with a human rights-focused litigation 
strategy. It does not yet have a stable legal reality, but the idea is invoked 
and enacted with a view from what it ought to ‘be’ and from decidedly 
human perspective and scale. In light of the matter of ‘climate justice’ 
not being fully formed, I approach the Carbon Majors Inquiry from a 
legal materialist angle. This is helpful for putting together a detailed 
picture of how an abstract, vast, planetary matter of concern may 
become materialised as a legal matter of concern. It shows how legal 
materials, such as trial locations, settings, order of witness testimonies, 
mobilise in a miniature-scale something so big in scale that would 
normally be numbing and immobilising. I hope to bring into vision a 
more granular understanding of how law is made, particularly at times 
when its matters and materials are novel or in a flux.
Third, legal determination of climate justice depends on establishing 
causality between the quantitative models of greenhouse gas emissions 
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and the qualitative determination of legality: how exactly are the 
calculated attributions of historical greenhouse emissions related to a 
legal attribution of human rights violation? How does law ‘calculate’ 
them in order to achieve ‘climate justice’, although justice is incalculable 
as Derrida had pointed out (opening quote)? These questions concern 
shifts between multiple scales and viewpoints in legal modes of 
knowing. I examine what counts as legally material knowledge in 
the unusual framework of the Carbon Majors Inquiry and consider 
whether the international human rights law framework is suited to 
grasp and adequately represent the different concerns that converge in 
and simultaneously exceed human language and cognition. 
The aim of this essay is diagnostic. It observes and describes the 
three above sketched issues within a specific setting in which ‘climate 
justice’ has been invoked. The genre is an essay; it tries to make sense 
of what is happening in the current torrent of events by taking a step 
back from the growing association of the meaning of ‘climate justice’ 
with international human rights and development. In the first two 
sections, I discuss the elusive value of ‘ justice’ and then the abstract 
scientific concept of ‘climate’. Yet the placing these two abstract ideas 
adjacent to one another, a literal spatial and temporal juxtaposition, 
seems to mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal action. 
In the third section, I describe the emergent materialisation of ‘climate 
justice’ in the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry’s London hearings. 
Less focused on the Inquiry’s findings, I am more interested in the 
material techniques and formats by which a legal matter of ‘climate 
justice’ becomes established: the unusual set-up of the mediatised 
hearings and the juxtaposition of numerical and visual representations 
of climate with personal narratives of climate change by victims of 
super-typhoons. 
This essay eschews a doctrinal analysis of environmental or 
international human rights law, or of multi-level jurisdictional issues. 
This is because I can neither identify a sufficiently delineated object 
of inquiry (‘climate justice’ - although it is very much desired and its 
lack is felt) nor an existing method (legal doctrines were emerging 
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rather than already there). Instead of assuming ‘climate justice’ as a 
premise or as an activist strategy, I hope to get a better sense of its 
present reality at the end of the analysis. I trace its current form and 
substance by attending to the specific modes by which words, utterances 
and objects act as constitutive materials for this emerging legal matter 
(see introduction to this issue; Kang 2018; Kang & Kendall 2019). A 
legal materialist focus might better bring into vision the complex and 
contradictory particularities of our present moment than a doctrinal 
top-down analysis or a policy-driven bottom-up ‘recipe’. 
1 Looking for justice
Derrida wrote that justice is unrepresentable, incalculable, excessive, 
donatrice, a gift (1990). Perhaps it was precisely the absence of justice 
related to matters of climate that mobilised ‘climate justice’ as a 
composite claim. I understand the claim’s strategic utility to consist in 
being able to hold at least someone or something (a legally incorporated 
persona, such as a corporation or government) legally attributable now 
for the climate crisis, which has however had and will continue to have 
a longue durée of past, present and future. 
In a moral, philosophical sense, climate justice does not have a 
stable meaning. Although justice is what most people will seek and 
equate with the legal system, when they bring a claim, and identify it 
as the purpose of law, it is elusive even in what seems most satisfying 
adjudicatory outcomes, which deliver some kind of recognition of pain, 
guilt, punishment, perhaps even restoration and remedy. But more often 
than not, law fails expectations of righteousness and moral certainty 
in adjudication; what seems justified for one party will not be so for 
the other. Otherwise they would not be in dispute. Most legal scholars 
and lawyers do not assume an overlap between law and moral justice, 
nor do they expect law to equate to or deliver ‘ justice’. This is often 
perceived as a gap between what is desired and what is achieved, and 
that is what makes law so disappointing and infuriating. I have yet to 
come across a law school module entitled ‘Justice’; in political theory 
and ethics, there are many. In law, both in word and practice, justice 
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is often framed as a question of fairness of procedure, reconstruction 
of events, evidentiary status, admissibility and judicial interpretation 
in inquisitorial civil law settings or weighing of arguments presented 
by the parties in light of statute and precedents in more adversarial 
common law traditions. A legal decision comes about as a result of the 
more convincing legal interpretation formed into a better argument. 
The scale of justice does not weigh the just against the unjust, but 
on the one side, there is the weight of arguments and, on the other, 
the counter-arguments.2 Whatever remains of justice is procedurally 
performed and bound in which the ‘whole’ picture is elusive. 
Justice is not a legal doctrine or principle. It is - to use Latour’s 
terminology - not a legal matter of concern. This sounds harsh, but this 
is not to say that it does not exist in different forms or manifestations 
of legal matters. It hovers as a real spectre around ‘law’, but is not 
part or inside of it. As Derrida wrote, “one cannot speak directly about 
justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say “this is just” and even less 
“I am just,” without immediately betraying justice, if not law (droit).” 
(1990: 935) What most legal theorists and scholars would agree on 
is that law has a specific ‘internal’ language and rules of the game 
which need to be mastered to understand it (Hart’s internal point of 
view or Wittgenstein’s language game) and that it relies on specific 
institutionalised media and a tradition of material techniques to 
perform its legality. Yet law’s origins and practical effects are ‘external’ 
because they depend on a group’s agreement about a legitimate recourse 
to sanction. Such an understanding of law as an effect or force can be 
found in Benjamin’s understanding of Gewalt, which denotes latent 
power or ‘force’. Gewalt was translated and connoted misleadingly as 
violence into French and English (Derrida 1990: 927).3 
Differently for Derrida, legal force is not a sovereign-juridical 
violence, but a différance of force, as he emphasised “also and 
especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest 
force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places. 
And that is the whole history.” (1990: 929) Legal force is not always 
physical enforcement and violence. Conversely, violence could also 
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be understood as the effect of the non-event of expected legal ‘force’: 
increased pressure to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and 
out-of-court settlements, lack of enforcement of alimony payments, 
defendants with no legal representation because of lack of legal aid, 
etc. Moyn has criticised the hope placed in (human rights) law and 
pointed to their adverse effects (2018) that are akin to a joke of “cruel 
optimism”, to paraphrase Lauren Berlant’s term. I would argue that it 
is equally possible to understand law or ‘legal force’ as a cruel pessimism, 
in which the default is an expected absence of any legal force, not to 
mention its elusive Other, justice.4 Such cruel pessimism is abound in 
domestic jurisdictions, but is particularly acute in international legal 
fields whose teeth depend on the interstice of the politically possible. 
Justice is what law cannot know and yet seeks as its unrepresentable 
essence. This raises the question why justice is still expected to be 
achieved through legal means and whether human justice could 
ever, even remotely, claim ‘climate’ justice, particularly when the 
meaning of ‘climate’ itself is abstract. Matters - issues - don’t speak 
by themselves without rhetorical, spatial and temporal frameworks. 
This is why the set of techniques and mediations through which they 
become material need to be examined. Thinking about what is ‘legal’ 
about legal materiality, I argued against a simplistic understanding of 
materiality as physicality (2018): certain materials (physical objects, 
images, practices, techniques) become enlisted by legal reasoning and 
give body to legal matters (matters of concern) in law, but the processes 
by which they become meaningful to law is not self-evident and needs 
to be explained. This implies that the idea of ‘climate justice’ may be 
located in the gap between legal matters (in this context, international 
human right principles) and the reality of its enactment through specific 
materials and their effects (the constitutive elements of the legal Inquiry 
and their lack of enforcement power). 
2 Looking for climate
The other element in the composite of ‘climate justice’ is ‘climate’. 
The concept of ‘climate’ is an unruly composition, which is often only 
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manifested and becomes visible as a consequence of anomalies, for 
example, the effects of changing climate on biopolitics of population 
health and migration, geopolitical calculations on water, securement 
of food supplies. Climate is not a representation of a singular process. 
It is also not a linguistic representation of a weather event, measured 
by temperature or precipitation. Its material reality rather consists of 
a composition of historical extrapolations, measurements, past and 
projected data, mathematical calculations of averages and means, 
and computer algorithms. It is a deeply temporal, yet also abstract 
composite concept. 
In the scientif ic sense of the term, climate is an artefact of 
measurement and calculation of means. The World Meteorology 
Organisation defines climate as “the measurement of the mean 
and variability of relevant quantities of certain variables (such as 
temperature, precipitation or wind) over a period of time, ranging 
from months to thousands or millions of years.” The average period to 
determine what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ climate is 30 years. Climate 
in a wider sense is also “the state, including a statistical description, of 
the climate system” which consists of five components: the atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, cryosphere, land surface and the biosphere also known 
as the ecosphere or the environment. Gabriele Gramelsberger, a 
philosopher of science, points out that the notion of climate involves 
both a scaling-up of historical, local and singular data that are taken as 
proxies and extrapolated into uniform data and datasets (2017). These, 
in turn, are modelled with algorithms to make an assumption of a 
‘climate balance’ as the zero-line ‘normal’ base case from an average of 
the past ten thousand years. The deviations from such a statistical mean 
value is then interpreted as climate change. Such a scientific concept 
of ‘climate’ is then a mediated and performative category that has 
undergone multiple layers of transpositions. It incorporates historical 
information, data, formats multiple singular data into uniformity, and 
renders them suitable for predictive modelling and simulations. 
Change of climate refers to a statistically significant variation in 
either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for 
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an extended period (typically decades or longer). ‘Climate change’, in 
this sense, depends on a statistical calculation of norm and deviation; 
in other words, it is an anomaly based on a broader temporal statistical 
framework of ‘climate’ that mixes factual and extrapolated data 
(Edwards, 2010). From the 1970s onwards, the noun ‘climate change’ 
however “became ‘an issue’ rather than the technical description 
of changing weather as it had been for the World Metereological 
Organisation in 1966.” (Hulme 2014: 1). 
The qualification of what constitutes ‘normal’ degree of harmful 
weather - abnormal harm - as opposed to climate change-induced 
anomalous degree of harm is often ascertained by recourse to scientific 
papers and quantitative calculations of past observable data. At the 
Carbon Majors hearings in London in November 2018, Myles Allen, 
one of the co-authors of the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC)’s special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C 
above pre-industrial levels, referred to a scientific paper by Takayabu 
and others (2015) that argued that the unprecedented intensity of 
storms can be traced back to human influences that led to an average 
of higher probability of increased wind level. Typhoon Haiyan that 
devastated the Philippines in 2013 was the strongest tropical cyclones 
ever recorded surpassing existing typhoon classification. The highest 
level until Haiyan was category 3. A new category of level 5 “super 
typhoon” had to be invented after Haiyan. It caused approximately 
6201 deaths, more than 27000 injuries and the displacement of nearly 
four million people. But it is not only the singular catastrophic typhoon 
that is beyond the abnormal level of harm. The frequency of harmful 
weather also results in an accumulated effect of anomalous level of 
harm. Philippines suffers from more than twenty storms a year on 
average.
Philippine is one of the countries assessed as being one of the most 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change to which it hardly contributed 
(Pretis 2018). Most countries who already do or will suffer from climate 
change are the ones which did not contribute to the accumulated and 
now exponential effects of human-caused climate change. Yet the actors 
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and factors that caused those highly localised sufferings are not here 
or there in the sense of law. They no longer exist or are already dead: 
historical emitters, such as British coal-fuelled factories, or companies 
that have changed their corporate identities in their imperial histories, 
such as Burmah Oil that became Anglo-Persian Oil Company and 
later, BP (Mitchell 2011: 43-65). Or they are not ‘legal persons’ in the 
jurisdictions in which they can be addressed and held accountable for 
the consequences of their action (for example, global shipping systems, 
elements of which operate under multiple jurisdictions). Historically 
most of the emission of greenhouse gases stems from the US (Malm 
2016). Global level of CO2 emission at 2018 was at a record.
The materiality of ‘climate’ in the narrow meaning of the term is an 
organic and inorganic composite of organisms, tangible and intangible 
knowledge systems and histories, which comprise a vast number of 
disparate elements that constitute the concept of ‘climate’,: gases, earth, 
plants, living organisms human and non-human, numbers, words, rock 
samples, photographs, computer algorithms for calculating means, 
simulations based on algorithmic models of future trends based on past 
data, scientists, international institutions, such as International Energy 
Agency, IPCC, parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, non-governmental organisations, working groups, emails, 
letters, meetings, protesters, networks on social media, plaintiffs, 
lawyers, judges, school pupils walking out, and so on. It is difficult to 
think of anything which would not qualify as being part of ‘climate’. 
The concept of climate links particular and sensed experiences 
that cannot be ordinarily related to one another into an overarching 
explanatory framework and relations of causality and probability. At 
the same time, by creating an aggregated scientific representation and 
modelling of particular and fractured realities of historical and local 
observations, climate sciences eclipse the specific, concrete, particulars 
into an abstract scientific model and re-imagines them as future 
fractured realities through localised predictions of climate change 
impact. Science thus turns invisible the particular manifestations and 
experiences, but makes visible the overall explanatory framework. Our 
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knowledge of climate and climate change “is a knowledge that can only 
be created via a techno-scientific apparatus so extensive that it is now 
an entire planetary infrastructure” (Wark 2015: 180). The scientific 
mode of knowledge shifts, reverses and invents different perspectives 
of our ability to ‘see’ and make sense of climate. Although such a 
scaling-up of vision entails all the problems associated with abstraction 
and its violence (Weizmann and Sheikh 2015), it also mobilises novel 
associations, such as the emerging legal practice of ‘climate justice’. 
3 Materialising the matter of climate justice: juxtaposing 
rather than translating 
The law of ‘climate justice’ is in the early stages of its formation 
(Jafry 2018; Klinsky and Brankovic 2018; Robinson 2018), although 
there is no shortage of academic work written on the ethics and political 
theory of climate change, referred to broadly as ‘climate justice’ (Shue 
2018; Gardiner 2011; Vanderheiden 2008). Different legal subfields 
can be mobilised to articulate what is just or unjust in light of the 
effects of climate change: tort, environmental, international, property, 
intellectual property, medical, company laws (see Setzer & Vanhala 
for an overview of litigation relating to climate change, 2019); but 
increasingly the term ‘climate justice’ has become closely associated 
with an invocation of international law of human rights together the 
aim of ‘development’ (UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights 2019). It embodies the premises that justice is a human 
matter and that human suffering ought to be remedied in order to 
benefit politically underrepresented people. 
Despite, or precisely because of, its avowed link to the legalistic 
and universalistic vision of human rights, climate justice may perhaps 
never stabilise into a coherent and overarching set of legal matters, that 
is to say, doctrines or principles, paradoxically because of its planetary 
scale of the problem, which needs to be scaled down to a much smaller 
scale of cause and effect relations that is recognisable to legal modes 
of reasoning. So far legal claims for climate justice have been marked 
by a remarkable fragmentation of non-binding, binding and yet not 
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enforceable, domestic and international legal obligations, agreements 
and laws.5 Yet in order for the scholar to observe how climate justice 
is increasingly figured as a legal matter, examining its materiality can 
help to break the complex matter down to its appearances, partial 
manifestations, experiences and materials: the text of the petition by 
the room of a ‘climate justice’ landmark hearing, the testimonies and 
expressions of panelists, witnesses, audiences, powerpoint slides and 
the position and movement of the video camera. It is in this sense 
that a draft text for the Paris Agreement can be the battle site against 
manifestations of injustice propelled by climate change, which the 
South African negotiator, Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko, had described as 
a “recipe for apartheid” (Malm 2015). The constitutive materials and 
media in the making of law shape the composition of a legal matter. 
They enable the idea of ‘climate justice’ to attain legal reality. 
It is taken for granted but really rather odd, that legal internal 
processes and formats remain relatively constant in institutions and 
across various jurisdictions, despite the plethora and scales of different 
issues brought to adjudication, inquiry or legislative deliberation. The 
phenomena that are associated with climate change are unprecedented, 
but these events are brought to the courts or tribunals that might 
employ the same legal formats of giving evidence or resort to the 
same doctrines, rules and processes that might be used in the context 
of, for example, property disputes about trees causing subsidence and 
harming the value of your neighbour’s property. This was the case in 
Lliuya v RWE (2015, currently ongoing in Oberlandesgericht Hamm, 
Germany, concerning Lliuya’s claim for damages from the German 
utility company, RWE, for its proportional contribution to global 
warming that is claimed to have caused the melting of glacier damaging 
his property in Peru).6 
This is particularly strange considering that all of the manifestations 
of climate change operate on different scales of knowledge and 
perspectival origins: weather is a singular temporal and spatial 
observation, it is perceived and felt by humans, whereas climate is a 
mathematical notion in reference to a broader temporal and spatial 
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framework. Climate denotes an absolute mean value, that is, a 
mathematical calculation that cannot be experienced. For example, in 
relation to the Watt-Cloutier petition seeking relief from violations 
resulting from global warming caused by acts and emissions of the 
United States and submitted to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Commission declared the petition inadmissible 
since “the information provided does not enable us to determine 
whether the alleged facts would tend to characterise a violation of 
rights protected by the American Declaration”.7 In other words, the 
Commission declared that human observations of changing weather 
and its effects, i.e. the “alleged facts”, could neither be linked to the 
legal conception of human rights nor to the science of climate change. 
The elements of a narrative were there, but they could not be linked into 
one another to form a more stable whole. They were not meaningful as 
legal materials. The questions at stake are which kind of experience are 
seen and can be made more legally material and how these different 
knowledges and claims can be juxtaposed so to give substance to a legal 
matter of concern. How did the Philippine Human Rights Commission 
approach the legal matter of climate justice and attempt to give legal 
shape to a plethora of phenomena that were both experienced and 
numerically calculated?
Commissioner Roberto Eugenio Cadiz, the presiding chair of the 
Commission, describes climate justice as an emerging idealistic and 
creative strategy of human rights law rather than reflecting an existing 
legal reality: 
The challenge to national human rights institutions is to test 
boundaries and create new paths, to be bold and creative instead of 
timid and docile, to be more idealistic and less pragmatic, to promote 
soft laws into becoming hard laws, to be able to see beyond legal 
technicalities and establish guiding principles that can later become 
binding treaties - in sum, to set the bar of human rights to a higher 
standard. (https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/). 
A number of such creative litigation related to climate justice is 
ongoing in multiple jurisdictions at the time of writing.8 In London, 
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Commissioner Cadiz straddled a fine balance between performing 
a recognisable legality, on the one hand, and on the other hand, 
stabilising a novel legal matter of concern by multiple associations: from 
historical greenhouse gas emissions to climate change, and from the 
unprecedented intensity of past typhoons in the Philippines to human 
rights violations. The Inquiry explored the nature of these connections 
and their limits. 
The spatial-temporal process of this Inquiry was unusual by being 
multi-sited and virtual. Commissioner Cadiz emphasised at the start 
of the London hearings that the aim of the Inquiry was to initiate a 
global dialogue around climate change. The hearings were held in three 
cities: Manila, the seat of the Commission and its place of jurisdiction, 
as well as the global centres of New York and London where it had 
no jurisdiction. The hearings were accessible to members of the public 
and the press. They were also livestreamed. A professional camera 
man recorded the hearings, whilst simultaneously keeping an eye on 
the livestream youtube page. The decision to have multiple sites for 
the hearing was peculiar, but apt: none of the major carbon producing 
companies are headquartered in the Philippines or are Philippine legal 
entities, they are mainly American or European ones. Dr Joana Setzer 
of the Grantham Institute for Climate Change at the LSE explained 
to me that “Commissioner Cadiz wanted this to be a global issue. 
He wanted to initiate a global dialogue rather than an adversarial 
confrontation.” The petitioners’ website also states that “the process 
would be a dialogue and not an investigation to determine guilt or 
innocence.” (ESSC, National Inquiry on Climate Change). Non-
governmental organisations, such as Greenpeace, the Sabin Center for 
Climate Change at Columbia University and the Grantham Institute 
assisted the Commission in the set-up of the hearings. 
Cornelia Vismann had insightfully analysed differences between 
hearings, trials and television tribunals (2003). I wondered what she 
would have thought of this special multi-location, multi-media, globally 
networked legal event. In the London hearings, the hard-working 
camera man consulted with Dr Setzer at the beginning of the first day; 
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moved back and forth between the camera which was placed next to 
the desk for the invited testimonies and the computer at the back of 
the room that was connected to the powerpoint screen; established the 
skype connection and checked for volume. From the outset, the hearing 
was to be livestreamed, recorded and uploaded to the www. It is in this 
sense that the hearings instantaneously formed a digital ‘archive’ with 
the ability to be immediately retrieved and circulated. The video 
recordings and their online presence were perhaps even more significant 
than the physical locations. The digital availability and circulation of 
the recording amplifies and accelerates the hearing’s status as an 
emergent (legal) matter considerably than the mere act of recording 
and inscribing a legal hearing in cellulose or silico. These digital 
mediations did not only reflect the global issue of climate justice that 
exceeded a single physical location, but it also strangely fit the plasticity 
and abstractness of both concepts of climate and justice. The online 
presence of the hearings gave shape to the composite term ‘climate 
justice’.
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Whereas the international mobilisation of NGOs, witnesses and 
experts reflected the multi-spatial nature of climate justice as an issue, 
the digital presence and multi-site format were certainly also creative 
solutions to the discrepancy between the occasion’s momentous legal 
creative significance to build a necessarily international jurisprudence 
of ‘climate justice’ and the Commission’s inability to enforce or award 
damages, because the formal format was that of an inquiry rather 
than one of litigation or adjudication. Although Dr Setzer introduced 
the Inquiry by embedding its importance in temporal terms as 
having an “impact on the past, present and the future”, some carbon 
major companies had disputed the Commission’s jurisdiction on the 
ground of the principle of territoriality. None of the carbon major 
corporations whose responsibilities were investigated were present 
at the hearings. The ethicist, Henry Shue, who testified via skype 
from Oxford, observed: “I think it is disrespectful not to respond. 
It does not take the Commission seriously and that is insulting to 
the Commission.” (my transcript) At the beginning of the first day 
of the hearings, Commissioner Cadiz recognised the legal norm of 
territorial jurisdiction and stated: “We respect the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction”. Yet the legal status of the Inquiry remained a fluid one; 
at one point, Commissioner Cadiz corrected himself when he said “in 
this court” to “in this room”. 
The London hearings took place in the medium-sized moot court 
room of the LSE Law Department. The room had been rearranged 
from its normal circular setting into a frontal one resembling a court. 
The Commissioners were seated slightly higher in a row facing the 
audience. The clerks sat to their right. Legal officials entered the room 
from a different door than the audience. The lawyers of the petitioners 
sat at a desk separated from the row of audience members. The witnesses 
and expert were summoned to a desk that was positioned between the 
audience and the Commission. It resembled the layout of a court room. 
Yet there were bits that gave inklings of this extraordinary yet somehow 
also strangely familiar mis-en-scène that distinguished it from a court of 
law. The overall atmosphere was one of a large gathering of people that 
already seemed to know each other from previous encounters. During 
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breaks people were introduced to one another, and the atmosphere 
was friendly. The two-days of hearing were organised as sequences 
of a mixture of invited witness and expert statements. Testimonies 
were invited rather than summoned. The statements and the format 
in which the experts presented resembled the academic conference 
with powerpoint presentations than a legal proceeding. Shue’s skype 
testimony was projected on a large screen. Presiding Commissioner 
Cadiz invited comments and questions from the audience after each 
testimony. 
The heterogeneous assembly in the moot court room - composed 
of people who lost their homes several times due to typhoons, human 
rights commissioners, their clerks and lawyers, fresh-faced young 
lawyers from Baker MacKenzie and Linklaters in the audience 
probably taking notes on behalf of their Carbon Major corporate 
clients, Greenpeace lawyers and activists seated next to them, expert 
and witness testifying over two days, and observers like me - made 
me think of the heterogeneous elements which materialise ‘law’: the 
distributed location of the hearings; media technologies of bringing 
the matter together; issues of law’s mobility, mobilisation of networks; 
the discursive construction of legal matters, which have the ability to 
materialise something which is not visible, such as global warming; the 
difficulty of establishing a legal matter despite real, physical, material 
harm as told in the powerful testimonies of typhoon survivors. There 
were also simultaneous fluidity and yet hedging disclaimer brackets 
between disciplinary expertise.
My initial interest in the hearings had focused on the ways in which 
the Inquiry would transform scientific attribution principles and risks 
into legal responsibility and liability by reference to the fast-developing 
area of so-called attribution science, which calculates and attributes 
a defined quantity of greenhouse emissions to individual companies 
or countries. Richard Heede’s 2014 report on Carbon Majors formed 
the central scientific foundation for the legal inquiry. It broke down 
the emissions to the largest carbon producing companies and states. 
The Inquiry’s remit of investigating human rights violations that were 
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allegedly caused by Carbon Major companies required a reconstruction 
of the linkage between historic greenhouse emissions, their contribution 
to climate change, legal obligations and responsibility not to violate 
them. In other words, the strength of legal reasoning rested on scaling 
down climate change models, linking past emission data based on past 
company and meteorological data across different spaces and actors, 
breaking down global carbon production over time, to typhoons that 
devastated the Philippines and in turn establish relation between all 
of the foregoing to human rights violations suffered by the petitioners. 
Law, particularly tort law, deals with issues of risks in which 
causality between the actions of the defendant and the effects on 
the plaintiff is difficult to prove so that a likelihood of harm, a legal 
determination, rests on probability calculations (Goldberg 2011). I was 
expecting a detailed questioning into the assumptions of Heede’s report 
and the attribution sciences, as the scale and complexity of proving 
the plausibility soundness of the petitioners’ claims was extraordinary 
and would require linking the three scales of the individual, legal and 
scientific experiences and modes of reasoning. But climate sciences, 
including attribution sciences, were not opened up and left intact as 
truth statements. Myles Allen, one of the co-authors of the IPCC 
1.5˚c report, had also testified in the City of Oakland vs Carbon Majors 
case (case 3:17 cv-06011-WHA-2019) earlier that year. He expressed 
his surprise about not having been queried about the soundness of the 
climate models in that case: 
Commissioner Cadiz “Are you aware if any of the fossil fuel companies 
use attribution science to look at their impact?”
Prof Myles Allen: “I am not aware but one interesting case, all on public 
record, the companies did not dispute the large-scale warming and 
attributable harm. The focus on what was known when. There was 
no serious debate about the kind of work I do. I came away a little 
disappointed because I was expecting an argument, and there was 
none.” (Transcript, London, 7 November 2018)
Perhaps based on previous experiences of giving expert testimony, 
Allen’s statement was the only one that attempted to draw a boundary 
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between ‘legal’ knowledge and other kinds, although he seemed to have 
a distinct sense of what would make a good legal argument or judgment: 
“The plaintiffs lost in San Francisco. I commend the judgment to 
you, it’s a very intelligent judgment ...as lawyers you should read the 
judgment, I am not a lawyer”. Later he reverted to his scientific persona: 
“I am only saying as a scientist what would have been technically 
possible.” Despite an explicit positioning of his identity as a non-lawyer 
but as a climate modelling scientist (“the panel should hear on climate 
change experts on the Philippines. I am global climate modeller, it’s 
not my brief ”), Allen’s statement was carefully crafted and delineated 
a historical relation between carbon emissions, scientific knowledge at 
a given point in time, and the carbon majors’ moral responsibility. His 
testimony linked the question of available knowledge at a certain time 
to questions of responsibility and harm. Allen addressed the question 
whether the companies could have foreseen warming and avoided harm. 
Referring to the economist, William Nordhaus’ 1977 ‘Strategies for 
control of carbon dioxide’ paper (Cowles discussion paper 477, 6 January 
1977), Allen contextualised the state of knowledge in 1977, which had 
- with hindsight - correctly estimated the change of global temperature 
with continued fossil use. He situated the “sciences” by explaining 
that Nordhaus’ study was not a “niche science”, but that Nordhaus 
was drawing data from mainstream climate science community at 
that time. These had not been based on modelled extrapolations, but 
on already available data about temperature and fossil expenditure: 
“This was not a niche research confined to a particular economist but 
this was reasonably established knowledge by the 1980s. The papers 
of fuel industry also show that they were well aware of the warming.” 
The industry, equipped with the knowledge in the 1980s, could 
have prevented the exponential climate change that we are currently 
experiencing. Here Allen’s rhetoric resembled legal advocacy than a 
disinterested Mertonian scientific expert statement: “The crucial point 
is - in my view - and I would like you to consider this - that there was 
an alternative course of action to the industry.”
Allen seemed fully prepared to provide justifications for the 
methodology of climate change models. He emphasised several times 
157
What if all we can see are the parts, and there is not a whole: 
elements and manifestations of the making of law of ‘climate justice’
that the attribution science findings had been based on historical data 
rather than modelled predictions. It seemed to me that he was acutely 
aware of the difficulty of establishing substantive legal connection 
between past moral responsibility to recent harm. Yet at the same 
time, when answering the question whether typhoons, such as the 
“super-typhoon” Yolanda, were caused by human factors or not in light 
of the findings by climate scientists (Takayabu et al. 2015), he worded 
his explanation with extreme care and differentiated between simple 
models of causality (Humean billiard game) and probable causality. 
It made clear that there was no linear or direct causality at play, but 
rather a higher probability of an event: 
... the answer is not certain. It’s not a billiard game. It’s a much more 
chaotic situation. You can’t say precisely in an individual instance that 
an external driver such as large scale warming will influence a chaotic 
event such as typhoon... You can’t say that there is higher wind due to 
human influence, but [we can say that there is] an average increase, 
higher probability of very high wind, with human influence.... it’s not 
the warming or human influences have caused the storms but we can see 
from the study (it can be recommended as it is a carefully constructed 
study) it shows how human influences have increased wind level and 
therefore made storms more intense. (my transcript)
I was sitting next to Veronica Cabe who survived a series of 
typhoons and also gave a testimony, as Myles Allen was explaining 
scientific graphs on the screen. I wondered what she thought of these 
visualisations when their experiences of the typhoon were literally 
so different from the “carefully constructed study” that was being 
explained. In London, two typhoon victims testified: Marielle Bacason 
who had survived Typhoon Haiyan and was now a research nurse based 
in London and Veronica Cabe who was a community organiser for the 
Nuclear Free Bataan Movement and had experienced several typhoons, 
the worst of which was typhoon Ketsana. All commissioners listened 
intently to their personal accounts of the typhoon, perhaps even more so 
than when they were listening to legal and scientific expert statements. 
Their faces were fully turned and attentive. Cabe’s statement of what a 
typhoon feels like when it occurs rendered on human-scale the reality 
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of what climate scientists have called “the increase in intensity of 
human-influenced storms”: 
the water level was rising up to roof level. I needed to reunite with 
my family. The priority was to bring cooked food (they had no food 
for 24 hours) and dry clothes because of exposure to cold rain. They 
were cleaning already stuck in knee-level mud. Everything was lost: 
personal belonging, underwear, toothbrush. I was worried about my 
father’s already bad health. 
The floods have changed our lives. I felt that parts of our dignity was 
lost [voice breaking].
We had to rely on help and donations. I went to relief lines and wait for 
hours, half a day for a parcel of relief, not knowing if it would arrive, 
line again for another day. Relief goods were thrown at us, neighbours 
were fighting each other just to get their share because it was chaotic, 
and the government was not ready for the ongoing floods at the time. 
We had to borrow money from anyone.
Monsoon rain caused flooding again. We lost everything again. 
I knew that typhoon would come again and wreck everything that 
we had put up.
When would this situation stop? 
When will the process of recovering and rebuilding end?
Until now we yet have to get back our own house. 
My mother has psychological issues.
My father before he died asked again and again: [says something in 
Filipino]
He was saying “when can we rebuild our house?”
In reality it is not easy because we do not have the money [voice breaks]. 
Are we going to move again?
[empathetic faces in the commission]
I think this is my reality.
For many Filipinos this is their reality.
There is no choice but to survive the typhoon. Having no water, no 
electricity, not knowing that the family is safe.
I ask: do we really have a choice?
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I have been engaged in local community organisation against coal 
and nuclear facilities.
I have seen that poor communities have become even more 
impoverished.
I believe that our stories and voices can be heard through this petition
I believe that the governments and corporations have the choice to 
act differently. 
They have the right to do their business but we also have the right to be. 
(my transcript)
Although the Inquiry had no binding force, it had a familiar legal 
format. The testimonies were ordered, presented and matched with 
their administrative filing numbers. Every testimony started after 
associating it with the filed documents for the ‘record’: 
Comissioner Cadiz: “what are the titles of these documents please?” 
Clerk gives the file designation, titles and length of pages (“consisting 
of 15 pages”) and adds that these confirmations are “just for the record”. 
The individual testimonies were left in their entirety and lightly 
questioned for comprehension. During the hearing, the Commission 
did not explicitly relate the state of scientific knowledge to a legal finding 
of a human rights violation. Myles Allen’s statement attributed the 
intensity of storm levels to human influence, but in my understanding, 
it appeared just short of establishing an unequivocal causal link between 
the responsibility of carbon majors to the human rights violations 
suffered by Philippine citizens. The hearing did not attempt to construct 
a coherent causal or teleological narrative. Nor did it choreograph or 
perform a drama. Rather it resembled a formalised, legally formatted, 
dissonant, polyphonic sequence. The order of testimonies seemed 
disconnected. The first day proceeded in this order: a UNICEF official, 
a UCL environmental scientist, a Church of England ethical pension 
fund advisor, followed by the lawyer acting for Lliuya against RWE 
etc. It reflected the fragmented totality of climate justice as an idea 
that ought to encompass multi-scalar, transdisciplinary, multi-species 
perspectives, but which remained bound by pragmatic constraints (who 
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would be available when) and traditional legal formats and procedures. 
The picture of a ‘whole’ - climate justice - in relation to its situated 
parts (testimonies, graphs, powerpoint, skype call, lawyers, cameraman, 
academics, files, screens, furniture arrangement) was left to the observer 
to piece together. This seemed to me more truthful and reflective of 
the current kaleidoscope of conflicting realities than an adversarial 
adjudicatory format could achieve.
4 Concretising climate justice by affinitive juxtapositions
I started writing this essay from a perspective of cruel pessimism, 
which expects the absence of legal ‘force’, rather than expecting 
climate justice designed around human rights to lead us into a cruel 
optimism of human rights. Yet these perspectives are perhaps not all 
that different from one another. Derrida conceived law, or the meaning 
of legal difference, as a permanent radical opening, as “a question of ... 
all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest force and greatest 
weakness strangely enough exchange places” (1990: 929). I do not 
expect the nomenclature and rhetoric of climate justice to reveal or 
deliver justice. 
However as an ‘internal’ point of view-agnostic-critical legal 
scholar, who diagnoses how law works with pessimistic hope, I can 
trace and try to explain how the components in the system work and 
how to think about and with legal materials when justice is uncertain 
and unknown: which jurisdictions were claimed or not, how the claim 
was framed, which principle was invoked or not - tort, property or 
human rights -, what kind of evidence was oral and/or in the form 
of a written submission, which testimonies were invited, whether to 
record and livestream the hearings, the depth of financial pocket to 
sustain the proceedings... These are the materials and ingredients for 
a practical strategy or diagnosis of the necessarily contingent practice 
and artifice that is law. It is the specific composition of these elements 
and their relations to one another within particular legal rhetorical 
and practical framings that I mean when I use the word “concrete”. 
To make legality concrete is to identify and observe the different 
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elements of the overall practice, how they relate, and what they do 
in such a process. I do not know for certain what justice is, and it 
is nothing insightful or novel to say that law fails it, but I can try to 
analyse and explain the texture of legal composition as it is practiced 
and the dynamic of a problematisation. Understanding the “plumbing” 
inside-out by diagnosing the particular ways in which the constitutive 
materials are linked to form an emergent legal matter could yield a 
more specific understanding of the often seemingly inextricable legal 
apparatus, abbreviated monolithically as ‘the law’ and the mechanisms 
of its stabilisation. This in turn might yield different strategies towards 
different ideals of justice; or at least, it might help us to understand 
law’s paradoxes and particular failures of justice’s absence. 
A contextualised, historically and theoretically informed notion of 
legal materiality is well suited to dissect and perceive shifts in scales 
and frameworks of reference. In the Carbon Majors Inquiry, ‘climate 
justice’ was materialised as a legal matter through specific locations, 
media and formats. The practices, utterances, presences, gatherings in 
the hearing and their textual and visual recordings were the constitutive 
factors for enacting the “matters of concern” of ‘climate’ and ‘ justice’ 
although the whole of ‘climate justice’ was yet undefined and may 
remain so. Nonetheless, the mediated aesthetics and spaces of the 
inquiry, climate models, speech acts shaped the emergent legal matter 
of climate justice despite a lack of jurisdiction. 
During the hearing, the Commission evaded the question of 
causality. This muteness reflects Lord Hoffmann’s observation that 
“causal requirements [in law] are creatures of the law and nothing more” 
(2011: 5). Instead of causality, the primary mode of relationality of the 
hearing was a different one, something I would characterise as affinitive 
juxtaposition. The hearing engendered a spatial and linguistic association 
between climate science and human experience by bringing together 
abstract scientific and personal knowledges and their different ways of 
knowing (by mathematical models and by narratives) into a common 
space. The Commission withheld from explicitly drawing relations 
between them. It also did not translate the concept of climate into a 
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legal idea of justice, nor did it transpose it. Rather here ‘law’ seemed to 
act as a distinctive attribute (‘legal’ testimony, ‘legal’ file, ‘legal’ inquiry) 
that imbued a shared quality amongst elements that had otherwise 
not much in common. The legal inquiry conjoined words, people 
and things loosely despite compressing climatic space and historical 
times into two days in a medium-sized room. The mere juxtaposition 
of diverse knowledges of the same problem (climate change) with its 
different phenomena produced associations: greenhouse emissions 
became associated with legal responsibility. But beyond this, there 
was no co-functioning that is characteristic of an assemblage (Deleuze 
& Parnet 2002: 52), no stickiness of knotty entanglements (Haraway 
2007: 287) and no entangling patterns of diffraction (Barad 2014). 
These may emerge in the future. For now, the only relationality between 
the materials was the differentiating practice of the Inquiry itself: the 
attribution of certain materials (witnesses, testimonies, presentations, 
graphs, numbers, narratives, moot court room...) as ‘legal’. The hearing 
invoked affinities between disparate parts through juxtaposition, that 
is to say, a literal putting-next-to-one-another.
The hearing in London did not mention or consider earth, or 
non-human entities, as legal agents. This is not surprising considering 
that the figure of earth is not a central component in both concepts of 
climate and justice. Despite Lovelock’s Gaia theory, Latour’s invocation 
of ‘earth’ as a political actor (2018) and Povinelli’s conception of 
“geontopower” (2018), earth is not (yet) a legal actor. Earth still needs 
to be ‘incorporated’ in law. Even if mountains are recognised as legal 
personae, they need friends to advocate on their behalf, to paraphrase 
Miguel Tamen’s book title, Friends of Interpretable Objects. Earth also 
needs friends to speak on its behalf. Yet I wonder whether the resort 
to human rights in face of a planetary and multi-species existential 
obliteration seems akin to asking nuclear scientists to assert their rights 
of nuclear research in light of nuclear warfare. Is the anthropocentric 
response to a problem caused by a peculiar kind of anthropocentricism 
- disembodied, rationalist and extractive-capitalist-imperialist - an 
inimical response to the effects of climate change? Is the human rights 
focus of the ‘climate justice’ movement re-enforcing an understanding 
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of global warming as a crisis for primarily humans? I remain conflicted 
between the conceptual contradiction of invoking the rights of the 
species that have caused the issue in the first place and recognising 
the need for an efficacious legal pragmatic strategy in order to reduce 
carbon emission down to zero. Malm (2018), for example, rejects the 
hybridisation of the human/non-human and the nature/culture binaries. 
He criticises the Latourian concept of actant and new materialist ideas 
of innate non-human agencies as diluting our responsibility to act. It 
is, however, not obvious, at all, that anthropocentric human rights law, 
or indeed legal avenues, are the right means to the end. Law has so 
far been a most impotent mode of human regulation in the face of the 
large-scale problem of climate change, which also affects other kinds 
of beings than humans.
My discomfort with human rights law as a truthful strategy might 
perhaps be alleviated if we diluted the human/non-human dichotomy. 
For our human language and discourses are not only our exclusive, 
purified domains, even in the realm of legal language which attempts 
to distinguish between ‘legal’ codes and materials and non-legal others. 
Human language is based on and surrounded by noises, as Lingis writes: 
The noise is not analytically decomposable, as communication theory 
would have it, into a multiplicity of signals, information-bits, that 
are irrelevant or that conflict... The noise figures as resonance and 
vocalization that, like the scraping wings of crickets we hear, contains 
no message [although crickets communicate in the ultrasonic range, 
too high for human ears to hear.] ... For we too communicate what we 
communicate with the background noise, and we communicate the 
background noise. (1994: 47-8)
The noise surrounding the Carbon Majors Inquiry is arguably even 
thicker, mixing the natural with the artificial. Added to the forceful 
“vibrancy of the land, the oceans and the skies” which move, rain and 
rise up, we also have the effects of oceanic cables, youtube videos, 
internet pages, camera angles and skype connections that represent 
these natural phenomena in other ways than as “noise”. We have 
multiple human actors: victims of typhoons, legal commissioners, 
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migrants, activists, lawyers, scientists, academics and journalists who 
share physical and online spaces with varying intensities. They are the 
ones which introduce the “noise” of anomalous climate and unattainable 
justice into the purified legal music of ‘human rights’ and corporate 
personhood. Already the noise might overwhelm any attempts to 
distinguishing them from ‘legal’ communication. At the hearing, there 
was no communication, but a calm sequence of cacophonic noises. 
Kohn’s How Forests Think (2013) employed Charles Peirce’s 
understanding of icon and index to make sense of non-human/human 
semiotics. The challenge for legal reasoning and imagination consists 
in “attending to the ways in which our linguistic, cognitive and bodily 
habits exist in relation to the world and emerge as a higher level of 
patterning against constraints around us” (Anker 2017: 208). I would 
add that such an imagination ought not only entail thinking law 
metaphorically in the modes of as or as if (Roger and Maloney 2017). 
Analogies and mimesis connect different knowledges via similarity, 
but also tend to privilege patterns of what we already know. We ought 
to make analogical explorations more careful by paying attention 
to particularities, that is to say, incorporate “respect for contextual, 
academico-institutional, discursive specificities, mistrust for analogies 
and hasty transpositions, for confused homogenizations” (Derrida 
1990: 933). Jurisprudential analysis has much to learn from the detailed 
studies of non-linguistic representation, visual or modal relationality 
and communication found in history of science (Hoffmann 2017), 
art theory (Stafford 2001; Weigel 2015) and musicology (Dahlhaus 
1968/1990; Pesce 1987), as well as from other kinds of semiologies 
and world views (Anker 2017) that can enrich and complicate law’s 
dominant tradition of written texts and narratives (Constable 2014). 
In law, in light of the finite little living organisms that we humans 
are, the scale of our importance is in an inverted and also perverted 
relationship to the planet. Such is the construction and practice of legal 
materials based on human communication, language, and their media 
of representation. In an anti-Copernican mode, in law, the world is 
comprehensible only if it revolves around it, and us, humans. In the 
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legal hearing, climate and justice are materialised and particularised 
into human narrative scale. This occurs by resorting to the universal 
principles of human rights. Climate justice advocates in the Philippine 
human rights inquiry entrench a clear distinction not only between 
human and non-human actions, but also between corporations and 
human. They enlist different materials - from climate data, research 
papers to eyewitness statements of typhoon Haiyan - to construct a 
legal matter from the standpoint of human. It may be a more efficacious 
as a strategy than representing or speaking on behalf of, for example, 
an ocean or giving legal standing to a river. 
Yet there is an undeniable gap between the ideals of universal human 
rights and of climate justice. Human rights claims cannot give justice 
to ‘climate’. Also it is not clear if ‘ justice’ makes sense to earth, fauna, 
flora. They may not perceive ‘ justice’ as such. Perhaps justice is sought 
for ‘non-humans’ in solidarity and with the help of some humans who 
are treated as ‘non-humans’ and who are already at the receiving end of 
global warming. The legal performance of ‘ justice’ through and in its 
materials (human rights categories, legal spaces, media technologies, 
filings, testimony of claimants, scientists, lawyers, ethicist, video 
recordings) may be incomplete and insufficient to represent and address 
the totality of climate change. Nonetheless it helps to particularise 
and ‘scale down’ a scale that is vast, probabilistic, rhetorically and 
technoscientifically mediated. It is our prosthetic ‘sensory apparatus’ 
of making and knowing climate change on a more human scale. 
Although it describes past events and experiences, ‘climate change’ as 
a reality denotes a statistical anomaly based on scientific models. These 
scientific numbers cannot be experienced in totality. We cannot feel 
a calculated probability. Arthur Koestler wrote that “statistics don’t 
bleed; it is the details that count. ... We can only focus on little lumps 
of reality” (1945: 97). Turning of ‘climate justice’ into a legal matter 
is then perhaps the difficult and fraught attempt to form “little lumps 
of legal reality” without a claim to representational veracity of the 
relationship between nature, earth, non-human and humans. It will 
result in representational violence to the majority of (non-human) lives 
and organisms, but law’s absence will, too. 
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defects in the area is vastly high. The groundwater still shows toxins 
massively above safe levels.” Union Carbide settled out of court; its CEO 
was never extradited to India despite an arrest warrant. Union Carbide and 
Dow Chemicals, which bought it in 2001, did not respond to Indian court 
summonses. In 1991, the Indian Supreme Court accepted a settlement 
which had the result of voiding all claims against Union Carbide and 
protecting the company from future claims. Would it have been better if 
there had been legal ‘violence’ or force, particularly in light of the scale of 
the Bhopal catastrophe?
5. The outcome of the appeal of the Urgenda case in the Netherlands 
which holds the government accountable for breach of its climate-
related obligations is expected for 20 December 2019 (CLI-number: 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:887). The case of the Swiss KlimaSeniorinnen 
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(Senior Women for Climate Protection) which claimed intergenerational 
rights and their violation of the government’s failure in meeting its climate 
obligations has been dismissed as having no standing. Currently the case 
is on appeal at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne. For more 
details, see < https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/english/>. Both are litigations 
against states alleging a state’s breach of its domestic and international 
legal obligations. 
6. Lliuya vs RWE. Case no. 2 O 285/15. Litigation against private entity.
7. 005 petition number P-1413-05; response: 2006 11/16/2006-AA-3276727)
8. The intriguing cases are the ones which attribute responsibility to illegal 
harm or violation, for they have to prove a causal and/or probabilistically 
plausible chain of reference from action (or inaction) to an illegal effect, 
such as violation of property right (Lliuya vs RWE, see endnote viii), of 
fundamental constitutional rights of “life, liberty, and property” and of 
“reasonable safety, and that of the Posterity”( Juliana, et al. vs USA, et al., 
case no. 18-36082, filed 2015, still ongoing at the US Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeal, for more information, see <https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
juliana-v-us>) or the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry that is discussed 
here. For an overview of national and international laws and cases, see 
the climate litigation databases maintained by Sabin Center for Climate 
Change Law at Columbia University <http://climatecasechart.com> and 
the LSE Grantham Institute <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/
climate-change-laws-of-the-world/>.
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